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Abstract—6LoWPAN networks involving wireless sensors con-
sist of resource starving miniature sensor nodes. Since secured
authentication of these resource-constrained sensors is one of
the important considerations during communication, use of
asymmetric key distribution scheme may not be the perfect choice
to achieve secure authentication. Recent research shows that
Lucky Thirteen attack has compromised Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
mode for key establishment. Even though EAKES6Lo and S3K
techniques for key establishment follow the symmetric key
establishment method, they strongly rely on a remote server
and trust anchor for secure key distribution. Our proposed
Lightweight Authentication Protocol (LAUP) used a symmetric
key method with no preshared keys and comprised of four
flights to establish authentication and session key distribution
between sensors and Edge Router in a 6LoWPAN environment.
Each flight uses freshly derived keys from existing information
such as PAN ID (Personal Area Network IDentification) and
device identities. We formally verified our scheme using the
Scyther security protocol verification tool for authentication
properties such as Aliveness, Secrecy, Non-Injective Agreement
and Non-Injective Synchronization. We simulated and evaluated
the proposed LAUP protocol using COOJA simulator with
ContikiOS and achieved less computational time and low power
consumption compared to existing authentication protocols such
as the EAKES6Lo and SAKES.
I. INTRODUCTION
The network of low power sensors called LoWPAN (Low
Power Wireless Personal Area Network) consists of small
sensors with limited memory, less computational capability
and low in resources. 6LoWPAN is one of the most important
communication protocols used in LoWPAN network. 6LoW-
PAN is designed in such a way that it can transmit the IPv6
packets over LoWPAN network [1] [2] [3] [4]. Security in
LoWPAN is provided through authentication of sensor device
before any communication happens.
Last MAC and Handshake Authentication methods are
mainly used to provide anti-replay protection and authenti-
cation [5] for low power devices. The MAC value (hashed
value of the message and key) of the previous message is
appended to the current message, and the receiver validates the
received MAC with the already stored MAC value. However,
this technique assumes that the receiver will always accept the
first message packet and globally shared keys for authentica-
tion. Even though ECC based Diffie-Hellman key exchange
with Kerberos authentication [6] for wireless sensor networks
provide high security, symmetric encryption and handshake
authentication are the highly desirable mechanisms to build
the authentication for the successive message transmissions of
LoWPAN devices. The public key method of key distribution
requires more computational time and energy which leads to
overhead for lightweight sensors.
The plaintext of LoWPAN communication can be recovered
from a DTLS connection using an OpenSSL implementation
of DTLS when using CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode
encryption [7]. So it is not a good idea to have DTLS for Key
management otherwise DTLS-CBC mode has to be enhanced
to manage Lucky thirteen type attacks. To overcome these at-
tacks, LAUP uses ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode of AES-
128 encryption. Moreover, compressed DTLS has six flights
for authentication, whereas our proposed LAUP has only four
flights for authentication and session key distribution.
Existing mechanisms such as lightweight IKEv2,
EAKES6Lo, S3K and compressed DTLS are providing
lightweight authentication for wireless sensor communication.
Lightweight IKEv2 [8] is secure but requires more memory
for calculation. EAKES6Lo [9] uses hash functions to
ensure the integrity of messages. Though this technique
uses symmetric key cryptography, it assumes that the secret
key distributed to every node by the remote server. The
distribution of secret keys remains a challenge.
S3K symmetric key establishment for IoT [8] uses trust
anchor and a resource server for key distribution among
clients. However, the secret key is shared between trust anchor
and resource server before deployment. The limitation of this
idea is that it is not scalable for a vast network and mobility
nodes. Maintaining the uniqueness of shared key between
trust anchor and resource server is complicated. S3K runs in
addition to DTLS and CoAP protocols which in turn, increases
the computational overhead of LoWPAN devices. Moreover,
the secure connection has to be established between trust
anchor and remote server before the key generation process
using TLS/DTLS.
After a thorough study on key distribution and authenti-
cation of 6LoWPAN networks, we come to the following
conclusions. The existing algorithms, which follow pre-shared
methods are facing problems while updating the keys and
having the assumptions of pre-shared keys. Moreover, they
are relying on a key distribution center to distribute the keys
TABLE I: Theoretical comparison and Features of LAUP
No Parameters Compressed DTLS EAKES6Lo S3K LAUP
1 Asymmetric method yes No No No
2 Symmetric + preshared keys No Yes Yes No
3 Use of Key Distribution centre No Yes Yes No
4 Symmetric + No preshared keys No No No Yes
which in turn cost more resources and providing protection to
key distribution center are another problem in real time. Well
established existing algorithms which are using asymmetric
method for authentication and key distribution are having the
limitation of spending more computational time for authenti-
cation. To overcome these existing constraints, we proposed
our LAUP algorithm for authentication and key establishment.
LAUP leads to the highly secured and easily adaptable authen-
tication method for 6LoWPAN networks. Table 1 shows the
explanation of our approach to 6LoWPAN networking.
Our proposed LAUP authentication algorithm addresses
the significant challenges such as a distribution of preshared
keys and usage of resource centers for key distribution in
the field of authentication among low power devices. We
made observations on how the conventional network protocols
compressed to be compatible with LoWPAN Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN). Our observation showed that Compressed
DTLS Handshake [10] uses six flights for authentication and
key exchange, whereas our protocol uses only four flights
for the same. To our knowledge, LAUP authentication algo-
rithm is the most suitable for 6LoWPAN network and secure
authentication algorithm without using preshared keys for
authentication and key distribution of LoWPAN devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
explains related works in the area of authentication and key
distribution of LoWPAN networks. Section III describes our
proposed work using session request phase, authentication
phase, and key distribution phase. Formal verification using
Scyther tool is presented in section IV. Section V analyses
the efficiency of the LAUP protocol against various attacks
of LoWPAN network. Performance evaluation of LAUP using
Contiki OS COOJA simulator is demonstrated in section VI.
Finally, we conclude the paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
APKES(Adaptive Pairwise Key Establishment Scheme) [11]
uses pre-distributed pairwise keys to derive pairwise session
keys for authentication. SPINS (Security Protocol for Sensor
Networks) [12] scheme provides security for wireless sensor
communication also obtains keys from the pre-distributed
master keys. Although AKES (Adaptive Key Establishment
Scheme) [13] system uses PAN ID and address of the sen-
sor for authentication and key distribution, it follows pre-
distribution of keys to derive pairwise session keys. Unlike
our LAUP, AKES uses the address of sensors to get the
shared secret keys, whereas LAUP uses MAC ID of sensors.
Moreover, sensors (LoWPAN devices) which are using AKES
scheme for authentication, to be preloaded with any of the
relevant addressing information like 8-byte extended, 2-byte
short or 1-byte simple address. Since LAUP uses MAC ID of
devices, it does not need any reloading of address. APKES,
SPINS and AKES methods discussed previously, but in most
cases, attention directed towards pre-distributed keys for key
distribution and authentication.
SAKES [14] and EAKES6Lo authentication schemes deal
with pre-shared keys among the 6LoWPAN host, 6LoWPAN
router, and 6LoWPAN edge router. EAKES6Lo [9] has three
phases such as pre-deployment phase, authentication and key
establishment phase and handover phase. The remote server
distributes private/public keys used by the sensors during
authentication. A registration request by the sensor node is
sent to the server with sensor ID and its public key. This
public key is derived using ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Helman) mechanism which is more power consuming process
for LoWPAN devices. But LAUP eliminates this additional
power requirement by not using a remote server for preshared
keys. LAUP focuses on preventing attacks on transportation
layer such as replay attack, a man in the middle attack, and
impersonation attack.
GDP (Group Device Pairing) does not need extra hard-
ware devices for preshared keys. Based on symmetric key
cryptographic techniques GDP provides secure communication
between wireless body area networks. Even though GDP
method [15] supports no redistribution of keys, GDP needs
human user intervention for verification during authentication.
Periodical updates of local keys [16] could prevent sensor
compromisation on static nodes. Smaller cryptographic keys
play a significant role in providing security for sensor commu-
nication [17]. Unlike GDP, LAUP does not need human inter-
vention during authentication and key establishment process.
Moreover, LAUP session keys are small and have a periodical
update for each session.
III. PROPOSED WORK
Our proposed LAUP provides security to the 6LoWPAN de-
vice communication by authenticating the intended 6LoWPAN
devices with Edge Router. 6LoWPAN is designed in such a
way that it can transmit the IPv6 packets over Low Power
Personal Area Network.
6LoWPAN protocol stack adopts bottom-most two layers
from IEEE 802.15.4. 6LoWPAN acts as an adaptation layer
between the link layer and the network layer. Figure 1 shows
Fig. 1: 6LoWPAN protocol stack
6LoWPAN protocol stack and examples of protocols used
in each layer. IEEE 802.15.4 supports only 127-byte packet
length of messages. But the Maximum Transferrable Unit
(MTU) of IPV6 is 1280 bytes. 6LoWPAN adaptation layer
provides fragmentation and re-ordering, and compression of
the protocol stack headers of IPv6 packets to maintain the
communication compatibility between IEEE 802.15.4 frame
and the legacy Internet message packet [1], [18], [19]. LAUP
works on transport layer of the 6LoWPAN protocol.
Fig. 2: System architecture
A. Architectural Environment
System architecture shown in Figure 2 includes 6LoWPAN
devices which are intended to communicate with the 6LoW-
PAN Edge Router. LAUP works on the 6LoWPAN wireless
sensor network communication between the 6LoWPAN device
and the Edge Router. To maintain the secure communication
6LoWPAN device has to reside on the coverage range of
Border Router.
B. Basic assumptions of proposed work
Every sensor identity IDS (MAC Address of sensor) is
registered with the 6LoWPAN Edge Router (6LER) and they
are physically secured. Our LAUP deals with 6LoWPAN
devices which are deployed within the coverage range of
6LoWPAN Edge Router 6LER. 6LER knows the PAN ID of
LoWPAN network, and we assume that the sensors connected
to the LoWPAN network are physically secured. We address
TABLE II: Key Derivation Process
Flight No Key Process
1 SK1 PANID
2 SK2 IDS XOR NonceS XOR SK1
3 SK3 IDER XOR SK2
4 SK4 Nonce
S
′ XOR NonceS XOR SK3
SESSIONKEY KSession SK1 XOR SK2 XOR
SK3 XOR SK4 XOR Nonce
ER
′
the authentication and session key establishment of sensors
when they are communicating to 6LER.
Each flight calculates its key for session key distribution
by following common key derivation method. LAUP does
not use any software or hardware based random number
generation scheme to produce nonce values. Instead, the time
of message generation on each flight has been taken as nonce
respectively. By this way of receiving a nonce value, reduces
the extra computational complexity and memory usage of low
power devices. Table II explains the key derivation method to
calculate unique flight keys. These methods use simple XOR
functions with available values such as PAN ID, MAC ID and
nonce values.
C. Proposed LAUP algorithm
LAUP allows sensors of LoWPAN networks to communi-
cate with a router to get cryptographically secure session key
by two level authentication using MAC ID of sensors and
their nonce values. LAUP algorithm gives protection against a
Fig. 3: Proposed Authentication Algorithm
Replay Attack, Man in the Middle attack, and impersonation
attack by including the MAC values and nonce values. Even
the attacker eavesdropped the message; he can not be able
to reproduce the same message since the message is in the
encrypted form and it needs the exact time of when the packet
was generated.
As a result of our LAUP algorithm, a unique session key
will be produced by the Edge Router for a sensor claims
“ SensorHello” request. Figure 3 shows the flow of com-
munication of LAUP between 6LoWPAN device and Edge
Router. To encrypt the messages in each flight, we use the
AES-128-ECB algorithm. A simple XOR function is used
as a hash function to produce MAC values in all the four
flights of communication. Figure 4 explains the process flow
of LAUP on Edge router. Our proposed LAUP algorithm has





1) Session Request phase: 6LS−→6LER:
SensorHello,(IDS)SK1,(NonceS)SK1,MAC1
MAC1= H [(IDS)SK1,(NonceS)SK1]
Session request phase comprises of flightone communica-
tion message. In this phase, the 6LoWPAN sensor which is
intended to communicate with the 6LoWPAN Edge Router
6LER sends the following content in its payload to the
6LER. PAN ID of the network acts as a flightone key to
encrypt the messages involved in first flight communication.
The identity(MAC_ID) and the timer value (time generated
by the sensor) of the sensor is encrypted by the flightone
key called SK1. MACone value is calculated by applying
the XOR function on the encrypted messages. Encrypted
identity, encrypted nonce of the sensor, MACone value and
“SensorHello” message are sent as a first flight information to
6LER. Hence the identity and the nonce value of the sensor
is retrieved by the 6LER.








After receiving the flightone information from sensor,
MACone value is calculated at Edge Router by hashing the
received encrypted values. Before validating the authenticity
of the sensor, the received MACone value is compared with
the calculated MACone value. If both the values are same,
protection against replay attack can be ensured, and the
authentication process is going to be carried out by the Edge
Router.
Two levels of authentication (Initial level and second level)
will be performed by the 6LER. Flow chart of Edge Router
process in Figure 4 explains the two level authentication
process in detail. In the Initial level of authentication, the
received flight one information are decrypted using an AES-
128 algorithm with ECB mode. Retrieved sensor MAC_ID
from flightone information is checked against the already
registered sensor MAC_ID. If a match is found, then 6LER
generates flighttwo key SK2 by applying the XOR function
on sensor MAC_ID, sensor nonce value and flightone key.
Otherwise, 6LER send “You are not a registered sensor” mes-
sage to the corresponding sensor and terminates the session.
flighttwo information is generated by the Edge Router and
communicated with a sensor which claims authentication for
session keys. Edge Router ID and nonce value is encrypted
with flighttwo key SK2 and MACtwo is calculated by using
a hash function on the resultant encrypted values. Along with
the encrypted values and MACtwo values, “ERConf” message
is sent to the sensor as a second flight information. After
receiving flighttwo information, sensor checks the MACtwo
value by calculating the same with the procedure followed by
the Edge Router for MACtwo calculation. If the MACtwo
is not replayed by any adversaries, then the sensor generates
flighttwo key SK2 and decrypt the received flighttwo in-
formation from the Edge Router. After the above steps are
performed, the sensor stores the ID of the Edge Router.
With the retrieved values from flighttwo packet, the sensor
generates flightthree key SK3 by applying XOR functions
between Edge Router ID and flighttwo key SK2. flightthree
information are generated by encrypting the old and new nonce
value of sensor and flighttwo key, with flightthree key. Then
MACthree is calculated by applying a hash function on the
encrypted values. Now flightthree information packet is ready
to send to Edge Router along with the “Sensor Challenge”
message. When the Edge Router receives flightthree infor-
mation from sensor, Edge Router checks whether it has sent
flighttwo information to the intended sensor.
Upon getting positive results of the checking operation,
Edge Router starts to process the received flightthree infor-
mation from sensors. Initially Edge Router checks MACthree
value by calculating it and compare with the received
MACthree value. If the Edge Router found, the packet is not
replayed, then proceed to calculate flightthree key SK3 oth-
erwise, terminates the session by sending “You have replayed
the message”.
flightthree information are decrypted using flightthree
key SK3 and Edge Router gets the information like old, the
new nonce value of sensor and flighttwo key SK2 calculated
by the sensor. Edge Router does the second level authenti-
cation by comparing the nonce value of sensor what it has
received from flighttwo and comparing flighttwo key SK2
value with the existing information. If the value matches, then
it starts to process the further required session key generation.
Thus the authentication phase of the sensor is completed by
the Edge Router.
3) Key Distribution phase: 6LER −→6LS:
Finished, ((KSession )SK4),MAC4
MAC4=H [((KSession )SK4),SK4]
flightfour key SK4 is the composition of old and new
nonce values of the sensor and then the flightthree key SK3.
The session key (KSession) is composed of flightone SK1,
flighttwo SK2, flightthree SK3, flightfour SK4 and nonce
of Edge Router at the time of session key generation. The
session key is generated by the Edge Router by applying
the XOR function on the above said values. The session
Fig. 4: Flow chart of Edge Router Process
key is encrypted with flightfour key SK4 and is generated
by the Edge Router. MACfour value is calculated using
XOR functions on encrypted values and flightfour key SK4.
After the cryptographic functions and MACfour calculation,
flightfour information is sent to the intended sensor with the
“Finished” message.
flightfour information are received by the sensor and
sensor generates flightfour key SK4 using the same method
followed by the Edge Router. A sensor checks whether the
message is replayed or not by checking the MACfour value
with the calculated MACfour. If the flightfour message
packet, through the checking operation of MAC values, then
the sensor decrypts the flightfour message and get the
session key (KSession). Thus the key distribution process is
completely done by the Edge Router to the sensor by means
of communicating four flight messages. This session key is
used as a key to encrypt the further communication.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF ALGORITHM
The Scyther formal verification tool is used to verify the
authentication properties of our proposed algorithm. Figure
5 shows the result of the LAUP algorithm using a formal
authentication verification tool called Scyther.
Definitions of Aliveness, Secrecy, the NonInjective - Agree-
ment, and Non-Injective-Synchronization are defined in [20],
[21]. Figure 5 result shows LAUP algorithm satisfies all the
specified authentication properties.
Secrecy expresses that certain information is not revealed to
an intruder, even though we are communicating this data over
an untrusted network. By maintaining the secrecy of Edge
Router ID, we can perform a second level authentication of
6LoWPAN devices with Edge Router also the intruder can not
get any information of Edge Router ID.
Non-Injective Synchronization property of 6LoWPAN sen-
Fig. 5: Automatic Authentication verification by Scyther
sor, ensures that it communicates with the intended party
6LoWPAN Edge Router and the contents of receiving/sending
messages are equal. Also, it guarantees the expected order of
send and receives actions.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The session key establishment and authentication method
followed by LAUP algorithm are well suited for LoWPAN
wireless network sensors. Because,the LAUP algorithm uses
lightweight symmetric cryptographic methods to establish a
session key and authentication process. Since the MAC address
of the 6LoWPAN sensor device and Edge Router are in the
encrypted form during the process of LAUP, it will not be
disclosed to an eavesdropper.
The proposed LAUP algorithm gives reliable protection
against the well known LoWPAN security attacks.
REPLAY ATTACK: LAUP protects the transmission of mes-
sages from replay attack in all the four flights by adding MAC
values, thereby the integrity of the message is maintained
throughout the algorithm. So insertion, deletion or modifi-
cation of messages could not be performed by the attacker.
All the four flight information analyzed step by step for what
would happen if the attacker captures the flight information.
The first flight message packet could not be reproduced by
the attacker because the packet contains information such as
sensor
′
s unique MAC ID and the timer value of sensor at the
time of first flight message generation and most importantly
they are appended with MACone value. The second flight
message contains the nonce value of Edge Router encrypted
with the unique flighttwokey SK2. Also, we proved the se-
crecy of Edge Router ID with Scyther tool, so that adversaries
cannot get this information and reproduce it.
This strongly encrypted value cannot be deciphered by the
attacker since he does not know the nonce value of Edge
Router. The third flight message contains nonce values used in
the first flight and the nonce value of the third flight, encrypted
with unique flightthreekey SK3. These ciphertexts are crypto-
graphically strong enough for the lightweight communication
and cannot be replayed so that the integrity of the message
maintained. The fourth flight message has MACfour value
and ciphered form of the session key. An attacker can get the
session key only if he knows unique flightfour key SK4. On
the whole, nonce values and MAC values prevent the attacker
from replaying the message and maintaining integrity.
MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK: LAUP protects the com-
munication of messages against Man in the Middle attack. The
man in the middle attacker possibly alters the communication
between the two parties who believe that they are directly
communicating with each other. But LAUP messages, in all
four flights, are encrypted with the secure AES-128-ECB
algorithm and unique flight keys.The flight messages are
constructed with nonce values. Also, Non-Injective synchro-
nization property is maintained.
IMPERSONATION ATTACK: Here an adversary can pretend
like one of the legitimate sensors in the LoWPAN network.
LAUP assumes all the sensors
′
identity are registered with
the Edge Router. Sensor hello request from an impersonation
adversary rejected by checking its identity.
VI. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED AUP ALGORITHM
Our proposed LAUP algorithm for authentication and key
distribution algorithm simulated in Contiki OS COOJA simu-
lator environment. Our simulated environmental architecture is
shown in Figure 6. We have taken Wismote as a sensor and the
Edge Router as well. The scalability of our proposed LAUP
algorithm is checked by adding 65 nodes to the network with
the Edge Router. LAUP simulated like an rpl udp client server
application whereas an Edge Router acts as a server.
Wismote voltage value and various current values such as
CPU current value, low power mode current value, transmis-
sion, and reception current values are taken from the Wismote
datasheet [22]. Power consumption is calculated using the
formula found in [23]. The sensor who wants to communicate
with the Edge Router is consuming 0.0456 mw of CPU power,
0.0048 mw of low power mode (lpm) power, 0.1567 mw of
transmission power, 0.3300 mw of reception power and 0.5371
mw of total power. We simulated our algorithm with ten sen-
sors. The graph in Figure 7 explains the comparison of com-
putational overhead of LAUP with EAKES6Lo and SAKES
[14] overhead values given in [9]. Although we compared
the authentication algorithms (EAKES6Lo, SAKES) which
TABLE III: Memory usage of sensor and Edge Router
text data bss dec hex filename
45619 350 13236 59205 e745 udp-clientv1.wismote
49253 402 13782 63437 f7cd border-routerv2.wismote
simulated in different environments, the LAUP authentication
algorithm provides 15 times less computational overhead than
EAKES6lo and 18 times less computational overhead than
SAKES authentication algorithm for LoWPAN devices. Figure
9 shows the power consumption value increases as the number
of nodes increases also this graph tells us power consumption
while receiving messages is high compared to the lpm, and
transmission energy consumption in LoWPAN devices.
The difference in power consumption of conventional sen-
sor (without any authentication) and LAUP sensor (with the
proposed authentication algorithm) is explained in Figure 8,
and LAUP consumes 0.13079624 mw more power while
transmitting messages than the regular sensor communication
without authentication. Each flight of LAUP is communicated
as a payload of the transport layer. Flight 1 (SensorHello) and
Flight 2 (ERConf) consume 64 bytes each. Flight 3 (Sensor-
Challenge) consumes 80 bytes. Flight 4 (Finished) consumes
48 bytes. Graphs in Figure 10 reveals the total processing
time of the LAUP algorithm for different sensors over time.
From this graph, taking the average of the total processing time
of 10 sensors, we proved that our proposed LAUP algorithm
takes less time to execute the full authentication algorithm. Up
to 65 6LoWPAN devices can be connected without resource-
exhaustion to the Edge Router in a specific position. Coding
of LAUP will be sent to the reader upon request.
Memory usage of LAUP algorithm is calculated on the
sensor, and the Edge Router based on the information found
in [24]. Table III summarizes the memory usage of the sensor
and the Edge Router. Data segment refers read-write data,
and bss segment indicates zero initialized data. The sum of
text, data and bss values mentioned in dec section. Flash
consumption of LAUP algorithm is 45969 bytes in sensor and
49655 bytes in the Edge Router. RAM use of LAUP algorithm
is 13586 bytes in sensor and 14184 bytes in the Edge Router.
The total processing time of our proposed LAUP algorithms
takes 421.3 msec which is comparatively lower than the
processing time of existing algorithms such as EAKES6Lo
and SAKES are given in [9].
VII. CONCLUSION
With the knowledge of existing algorithms and their limi-
tations in the field of authentication and key distribution, we
proposed our LAUP algorithm to overcome these limitations.
Our algorithm formally verified by the formal verification tool
called “Scyther”, and we proved that authentication properties
such as Aliveness, NonInjective Agreement, Secrecy of keys
and Non-Injective Synchronization are maintained. Moreover,
LAUP algorithm works with UDP protocol and possible
threats such as Replay attack, Man in the Middle attack and
Fig. 6: Simulation Scenario implementing LAUP
Fig. 7: Comparison of computational Overhead
Fig. 8: Powerconsumption overhead
impersonation attack are analyzed theoretically in section v.
In addition to the formal verification proof, we presented
simulation results using the Contiki OS COOJA simulator with
Fig. 9: Power Consumption based on number of Nodes
Fig. 10: Total processing time using LAUP
ten 6LoWPAN sensors as clients and one Edge Router. The
simulation results broadly supported theoretical predictions.
Evaluation of the proposed algorithm carried out based on
the simulation time. From our evaluation results, we can say
that our algorithm is highly secured since LAUP generates
the respective keys for each flight using the nonce value of
sensors and Edge Router. Additionally, this LAUP algorithm
is flexible to update the keys after each session. In future,
we will deploy our LAUP using a testbed and compare the
result with the simulation results. Also, LAUP will be tested
against Sybil attacks using Cooja simulator and the hardware.
From the verification tool result and the evaluation result
of the simulation, we proved that the LAUP algorithm for
authentication and key distribution is highly secured, scalable
for LoWPAN networks and flexible enough to update the keys.
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